James Bayliss v. New Jersey State Police by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-13-2015 
James Bayliss v. New Jersey State Police 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"James Bayliss v. New Jersey State Police" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 869. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/869 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4180 
___________ 
 
 
JAMES BAYLISS 
                                          
v. 
 
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE; TROOPER R. WAMBOLD, JR.,  
individually and in his capacity as a member of the New Jersey State Police;  
TROOPER K. JUCKETT, individually and in his capacity as a member of the  
New Jersey State Police; JOHN DOES (1-10), individually and in 
their official capacities with various Law Enforcement Agencies 
 
Richard Wambold, 
                                  Appellant 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
  for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-11-cv-00890) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary L. Cooper 
____________________________________ 
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2015 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE, AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 13, 2015) 
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OPINION* 
   
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Before this Court is Trooper Richard Wambold’s challenge to the District Court’s 
decision to (1) affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order that Wambold return certain 
documents he obtained during discovery and (2) terminate the case, thus preventing 
Wambold from asserting various counterclaims, cross-claims, and a third-party complaint 
against the State of New Jersey (the “State”) and the Office of the Attorney General of 
New Jersey (“OAG”).  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
 The Plaintiff, James Bayliss, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
Wambold, another Trooper, and the New Jersey State Police (the “State Police”) alleging 
that the two Troopers used excessive force against him during a traffic stop and arrest.  
Initially, State counsel represented all three defendants.  After the suit was filed, the State 
Police’s Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) conducted an internal investigation 
and brought administrative proceedings against the Troopers.  The Attorney General thus 
terminated the State’s representation and indemnification of Wambold.  Wambold then 
filed a Motion to Amend his Answer to plead cross-claims and a third-party complaint 
against the State Police, State, and OAG for indemnification, contribution, legal 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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malpractice, violation of the duty of loyalty, violation of contract, collateral estoppel, and 
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, as 
well as counterclaims against Bayliss for costs and attorneys’ fees.    
 Meanwhile, during discovery, Wambold came into possession of OPS “Review 
Sheets,” which contained the opinions of senior State Police personnel regarding the 
sufficiency of the investigation into the Troopers’ conduct and their recommendations as 
to whether the Troopers should be disciplined.  The State Police filed a motion seeking 
return of the Review Sheets on March 18, 2013 (the “Clawback Motion”), arguing that 
they were disclosed inadvertently and protected by the deliberative process privilege. 
 While both the Motion to Amend and Clawback Motion were pending, the State 
settled all of Bayliss’s claims, including his claims against Wambold.  As a result, on 
August 29, 2013, the Magistrate Judge terminated Wambold’s Motion to Amend and 
instructed Wambold to indicate whether he intended to refile the motion.1  The 
Magistrate Judge then granted the Clawback Motion on September 20, 2013, and denied 
Wambold’s Motion for Reconsideration of that order on December 9, 2013. 
                                              
 1 Wambold suggested in correspondence with the Magistrate Judge that he would 
refile the Motion to Amend unless the State “agree[d] to waive any argument or defense 
that it may assert with the State Court or in any other forum as to collateral estoppel, res 
judicata, or any other form of claim preclusion including State of Limitations.”  Joint 
Suppl. App. 199.  The State replied that Wambold presented no basis for federal 
jurisdiction, and thus, would not “agree to anything other than a standard stipulation of 
dismissal without prejudice.”  Letter from John M. Bowens, Esq., Oct. 22, 2013, ECF 
No. 107.  Nonetheless, Wambold never refiled the Motion to Amend. 
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 Wambold appealed the Magistrate Judge’s orders granting the Clawback Motion 
and denying the Motion for Reconsideration,2 and the District Court affirmed both on 
September 17, 2014.  In the same Order, the District Court directed the clerk to close the 
case in its entirety, observing that all of the pending claims had been settled and that 
Wambold’s proposed counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims were barred by 
Younger abstention and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  The District Court explained, 
however, that it did not bar Wambold “from attempting to bring a completely separate 
action asserting his claims in federal court.”  App. 39.  Wambold then sought review in 
this Court, naming only the September 17, 2014 Order in his Notice of Appeal.  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Bayliss’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction over Wambold’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review the decision to grant the State’s Clawback Motion for abuse of discretion.  See 
Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 138 (3d Cir. 2000).   
III. Discussion 
 Wambold contends the Magistrate Judge and District Court erred in finding that 
the OPS Review Sheets were protected by the deliberative process privilege, which 
“permits the government to withhold documents containing ‘confidential deliberations of 
law or policymaking, reflecting opinions, recommendations or advice.’”  Redland Soccer 
                                              
 2 He did not seek review of the August 2013 termination of his Motion to Amend. 
 
5 
 
Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Army of U.S., 55 F.3d 827, 853 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting In re Grand 
Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 959 (3d Cir. 1987)).  “It recognizes ‘that were agencies forced to 
operate in a fishbowl, the frank exchange of ideas and opinions would cease and the 
quality of administrative decisions would consequently suffer.’”  Id. at 854 (quoting First 
Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).  Accordingly, a 
governmental entity asserting the privilege must show that the material sought is pre-
decisional and deliberative.  Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 
183 (3d Cir. 2007); Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 853-54. 
 We agree that the Review Sheets are protected by the deliberative process 
privilege.  As explained in the Certification of Major David C. Jones, the Commanding 
Officer of OPS, after an investigation into alleged misconduct, supervising members of 
OPS review the investigating officer’s findings.  The supervising members offer their 
opinions on the investigation and their recommendations as to whether to impose 
discipline in the Review Sheets.  Major Jones then considers the complete file, including 
the Review Sheets, in formulating a recommendation for the Superintendent of the State 
Police, who renders the final decision on any disciplinary actions.  As such, the Review 
Sheets are clearly pre-decisional and deliberative. 
 Wambold argues the Review Sheets cannot be privileged because they constituted 
part of the State’s file in representing him in this lawsuit and should have been turned 
over to his counsel when the State ended its representation of him.  This argument 
conflates the State Police’s internal deliberations regarding their disciplinary processes—
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deliberations solely within OPS—and the representation of Wambold by the OAG, and 
there is no indication that the Review Sheets were part of the files maintained by 
Wambold’s State counsel.  Wambold further asserts that the Review Sheets are not pre-
decisional because the State later reversed its decision to represent him, but that does not 
change the privileged character of the Review Sheets.  The need to protect officials’ 
deliberations about one decision does not evaporate because those officials make other 
decisions.  
   Additionally, the Magistrate Judge and the District Court properly balanced 
Wambold’s need for the privileged material against the government’s interest in 
confidentiality.  Because the deliberative process privilege is not absolute, a court 
deciding whether to grant discovery must consider, among other factors, “(i) the 
relevance of the evidence sought to be protected; (ii) the availability of other evidence; 
(iii) the ‘seriousness’ of the litigation and the issues involved; (iv) the role of the 
government in the litigation; [and] (v) the possibility of future timidity by government 
employees who will be forced to recognize that their secrets are violable.”  Redland 
Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 854 (alteration in original) (quoting First Eastern Corp., 21 F.3d 
at 468 n.5) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, Major Jones indicated that 
disclosure of the Review Sheets would have a chilling effect on the candor of the 
reviewing officers, which would impact his ability to make a recommendation to the 
Superintendent.  Further, the Review Sheets, which did not contain any factual material 
that was not disclosed to the parties, had little relevance to the only claims before the 
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District Court—Bayliss’s claims for excessive force—and even those had been dismissed 
by the time the Magistrate Judge ruled on the Clawback Motion. 
 Finally, we agree that the privilege was not waived because the disclosure was 
inadvertent, and the State took reasonable steps in preventing and rectifying the 
disclosure.  See Fed. R. Evid. 502(b).  The record is unclear regarding how the Review 
Sheets came into Wambold’s possession, but the State demonstrated that the disclosure 
was unauthorized, and as such, led to an OPS investigation.  Moreover, upon learning of 
the disclosure via references in Wambold’s Motion to Amend, the State immediately 
requested return of the Review Sheets, and upon Wambold’s refusal, filed the Clawback 
Motion.  Therefore, we conclude that neither the Magistrate Judge nor the District Court 
abused their discretion by granting the Clawback Motion. 
 Wambold also argues that “[t]he District Court erred in determining the amended 
complaint would be precluded by the Younger abstention doctrine” and asks that we 
“vacate the District Court opinion about the application of the Younger doctrine.”  
Appellant’s Br. 33.  But Wambold never appealed the Magistrate Judge’s termination of 
his Motion to Amend, nor did he file a subsequent Motion to Amend.  As a result, 
Wambold waived his right to challenge the termination, and his proposed counterclaims, 
cross-claims, and third-party complaint were never properly before the District Court.  
See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A] 
party failing to appeal to the district court a magistrate judge’s order in a nondispositive 
matter may not raise an objection to it on appeal to a circuit court.”).  Because neither the 
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Motion to Amend nor the amended Answer are before us now, we need not address 
whether Wambold’s proposed claims can survive should he decide to reassert them in 
another action.  
 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.      
